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Abstract
In many European countries, there is an unmissable trend towards stricter tobacco con-
trol policies and a parallel reduction in the prevalence of smoking. The extent to which
policies promote this latter trend, however, is less clear. We therefore analyze the staggered
introductions of smoking bans and the variation in cigarette taxes over more than twenty
years. After taking into account unobserved country- and time-specific effects as well as
country-specific trends, we find no clear evidence that smoking bans are associated with
lower levels of smoking. In contrast, higher cigarette prices tend to be negatively related to
smoking, in particular for men and people under the age of 30. However, price elasticities are
small. Overall, the results suggest that only about one sixth of the decline in the prevalence
of smoking in Europe can be explained by our policy variables.
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1 Introduction
Smoking is a major and persistent public health issue in many countries around the world
(e.g., Jha and Peto 2014 or World Health Organization 2015). We focus on Europe, where the
situation is characterized by a series of trends. There is a general downward trend in smoking
prevalence. In the 12 member countries of the European Union back in 1992, 35.2 percent of the
adult population smoked cigarettes on a regular basis. By 2012, the fraction is decreased to 26.1
percent in the same countries.1 During the same time period, there is a clear upward trend in
cigarette taxes and, consequently, in cigarette prices (see, e.g., Bogdanovica et al. 2012; Blecher
et al. 2013). A more recent trend – and a fundamental extension of tobacco control policies in
many European countries – is the introduction of smoking bans in the hospitality sector as well
as at many workplaces (see, e.g., Studlar et al. 2011 or Toshkov 2013). With regard to the trends
in cigarette tax increases and the introduction of smoking bans, there is a controversial debate
as to whether these interventions are successful preventive health policies and whether and to
what extent they promoted the observed decline in smoking prevalence in Europe. In fact, there
might be an underlying fourth trend towards generally less favorable attitudes regarding the
consumption of cigarettes affecting smoking prevalence as well as electoral support for tougher
policy interventions (see, e.g., Chapman and Freeman 2008, Mart´ınez-Sa´nchez et al. 2010, or
Rennen et al. 2014).
In this paper, we try to better understand these trends and evaluate how cigarette prices and
smoking bans are related to smoking prevalence (extensive margin) as well as to the number
of cigarettes smoked (intensive margin). We present an empirical analysis based on a newly
compiled large-scale country panel data set on individual smoking behavior in 21 European
countries spanning over a period of 23 years. Data is from 9 survey-waves of the Eurobarometer
involving more than 138,000 adult respondents and 162 country-year observations. To our
knowledge, this is one of the largest data sets so far compiled for the purpose of studying the
effects of tobacco control policies on individual smoking behavior for European countries.
1We draw these estimates from data of the Eurobarometer survey series (no comparable data for Greece is
available).
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There is a substantial body of literature that is concerned with the understanding of the regu-
lation of individual smoking behavior.2 However, many of the advanced empirical analyses deal
with the experience of the United States, and much less is known about the drivers of differential
smoking behavior in Europe. Differentiating between the two settings is crucial though, since
the prevalence of smoking is on average about 10 percentage points higher in European countries
compared to the United States (Cutler and Glaeser 2009).
Studies for Europe often rely on cross-country comparisons or are conducted based on time series
for single countries (see, e.g., Gallus et al. 2006 or Ferna´ndez et al. 2004 for cigarette prices,
and Anger et al. 2011, Jones et al. 2015 or Del Bono and Vuri 2017 for smoking bans). The few
studies that use repeated cross-sectional data often have a different focus (e.g., Chaloupka et al.
2010 concentrate on the impact of tobacco tax structures on prices or Palali and van Ours 2017
analyze smoking initiation) or rely on either fewer countries (e.g., the study by Hu et al. 2016
based on nine countries) or fewer years of data (e.g., the analysis in Bosdriesz et al. 2016 based
on a sample over seven years). The respective designs are thus less well-suited to approach an
analysis of the general trends in smoking behavior throughout Europe.
Our analysis builds on the existing literature and tries to advance it in several directions. First,
the empirical evaluation relies on a comprehensive and comparable data set from one source for
the measurement of individual smoking behavior. The comparability of (aggregated) data on
smoking behavior from different sources is often limited and is prone to suffer from structural
breaks in the time series due to changing survey methods.3 Second, we simultaneously take
into account trends in cigarette prices as well as spatial consumption restrictions. To identify
the effect of smoking bans, we exploit the staggered introduction of smoking bans across 24
European countries and regions (the introduction dates vary across the entities of the United
Kingdom). We build an index for the presence of smoking bans that reflects the introduction
date as well as the comprehensiveness and enforcement of the bans. The effect of cigarette prices
2For general accounts of tobacco policies within the economics of smoking, see, e.g., Viscusi (1992), Chaloupka
and Warner (2000), Gruber (2001), and Cnossen (2006).
3Bogdanovica et al. (2011), for example, provide a comparison of survey methods applied to measure country-
specific smoking prevalence in European countries in 2006. For some countries there are sizable differences of up
to 13 percentage points between the national measures and the values generated based on the Eurobarometer.
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is identified based on their variation within countries over time. Third, the econometric analysis
takes into account the potential endogeneity of cigarette prices by applying an instrumental
variable strategy which uses taxes as instruments. Fourth, in our statistical evaluation, we take
into account general country-specific time trends that might drive observed simple correlations.
Our data reveals a downward trend in smoking behavior in our sample of European countries over
the time period of more than twenty years. On average, the smoking prevalence diminishes by
0.42 percentage points per year, and the number of cigarettes daily smoked by smokers decreases
slightly by 0.04 cigarettes a year. Simultaneously, real cigarette prices increased by more than 60
percent between 1990 and 2012, combined with nationwide introductions of smoking bans. The
descriptive analysis shows a negative correlation between cigarette prices and the prevalence of
smoking. The introduction of smoking bans is negatively correlated with smoking prevalence
and with smokers’ cigarette consumption.
However, we do not find robust negative effects of the tobacco control policies on smoking
behavior once we take time fixed effects and country-specific time trends into account. For the
full sample, regression results for smoking prevalence do not indicate clear and precise estimates
for price sensitivity or any systematic reaction to the introduction of smoking bans. In the
specification where we instrument for cigarette prices using excise taxes, we find a price elasticity
for smoking prevalence of -0.11 that is not statistically significant. In the conditional demand
analysis, capturing the effect of the policies on the amount of cigarettes consumed by daily
smokers, we find a smaller negative price elasticity of -0.08 that is not statistically significant
either. With a 50 percent price increase, the elasticities compare to an average decrease in the
smoking propensity of 1.22 percentage points and in the smoking intensity (i.e., the number
of cigarettes consumed by smokers) of 0.52 cigarettes, respectively. The analysis for subgroups
shows heterogeneity in the effects of higher cigarette prices. For the propensity to smoke, the
negative effect is driven by males and people under the age of 30. For the intensity of smoking,
we find the biggest effect for young people. Based on these findings, it is difficult to reject the
thesis that social trends account for the largest part of the decline in smoking prevalence, rather
than the adoption of tougher tobacco control policies.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the tobacco control policies
applied in the European Union as well as our index for smoking bans are introduced. Section
3 describes the country panel data on smoking behavior as well as some first descriptive anal-
yses. The results of the econometric analysis are presented in Section 4. Section 5 offers some
concluding remarks.
2 Tobacco Control Policies in the Member Countries of the Eu-
ropean Union
In Europe, tobacco control measures are primarily enacted and implemented by the federal and
sub-federal governments of individual countries (see, e.g., the review in Studlar et al. 2011).
This holds in particular for the two major policies, i.e., cigarette taxes and smoking bans. The
European Union complements the policies and measures of its member states by adopting spe-
cific legislations (for example, on tobacco products), releasing recommendations, and running
information campaigns. We concentrate on taxes and smoking bans and use quantitative mea-
sures that allow us to make both of these policies comparable across countries as well as over
time. As taxes only affect behavior via their effect on prices, we also compile a comparable data
set on prices.4
2.1 Cigarette Prices and Taxes
Information on cigarette prices and the tax structures of tobacco products in the EU member
countries is provided in the Excise Duty Tables on manufactured tobacco from the European
Commission European Commission (1990-2012b). From this data, we use the price information
provided for the most popular price category (MPPC). The MPPC represents the price per 1,000
cigarettes of the most popular brand in a country. It served as the benchmark price category
for the minimum taxation requirements in the European Union and provides a measure for
4In a companion paper, we use the same data sources to study the effect of tobacco control policies on individual
life satisfaction (Odermatt and Stutzer 2015).
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comparing cigarette prices across countries and years. The primary channel through which
policymakers can influence the cigarette price is through changes in tax levels. The excise tax
structure comprises a specific tax, i.e., a fixed amount per 1,000 cigarettes, and an ad valorem
excise tax, i.e., a percentage of the retail selling price. According to the European council
directive (2011/64/EU), the overall tax yield from these two sources must not be less than
EUR 64 per 1,000 cigarettes (or at least 57 percent of the retail price). Despite these minimum
taxation requirements, there is remarkable variability in the imposed taxes and the cigarette
prices across EU member countries with upward trends over time in most of them.
Figure A.1 provides an overview of the variation in the price and excise tax levels across
countries and over time. To make these values comparable across the countries, we adjust the
prices and the specific tax for the country-specific price levels and report them in constant
prices, i.e., the currency value for the euro in 2005. The dark gray and light gray solid lines
show the development of the real MPPC cigarette price and the real specific tax, respectively.
The dashed line indicates the ad valorem tax rates (between 0 and 1). The average real
cigarette price in the sample is 163.40 euros per 1,000 cigarettes (or 3.26 euros per package of
20 cigarettes) with a standard deviation of 60.90 euros. From 1990 to 2012 the average price
in our sample increased by more than 60 percent, and the average increase in the tax level was
about 50 percent. A similar but less pronounced positive trend can be observed for the specific
tax rate, with an average level of 43.90 euros with a standard deviation of 38.46 euros. The
average ad valorem tax rate is 0.35 (or 35 percent).
2.2 Smoking Bans
Today, smoking bans have become a common tool for preventive health care policy around
the world. Many countries ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The
treaty obliges the member states to reinforce their effort to reduce the dissemination of smoking.
In response, many countries introduced smoking bans in indoor workplaces, indoor public places,
public transport and in bars and restaurants; i.e., the hospitality sector. In Europe, the first
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country that banned smoking comprehensively was Ireland in March 2004. In the meantime,
almost all European countries have introduced some type of spatial smoking restriction.
Table A.1 gives an overview of the introduction dates of workplace and hospitality sector bans
in the 24 countries and regions in our sample.5
Some countries first introduced bans only in workplaces. In a second step, the bans were then
extended to the hospitality sector. This occurred in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, the
Netherlands and Slovakia. In Latvia and Spain, the ban in the hospitality sector was tightened
four years after its implementation. We take account of the fact that the comprehensiveness of
the bans differs across the countries and regions. For these particularities, we use the scores of
the Tobacco Control Scale (TCS) (Joossens and Raw 2006, 2007, 2011) to qualify the bans.6
3 Data on Smoking Behaviour and Descriptive Analysis
To study the effects of smoking bans and cigarette price increases on smoking behavior, we make
use of the individual-level data from the Eurobarometer surveys (EB) (European Commission
2012a). The EB is a repeated cross-section survey in the member states of the European Union
regarding people’s attitudes and public opinion in general. Intermittently, the EB addresses
special topics, such as health-related issues that include smoking behavior. We make use of two
measures. First, we identify whether an individual smokes or not. People are considered smokers
when they indicate that they smoke manufactured or roll-your-own cigarettes, cigars or a pipe.
Former smokers are classified as non-smokers. Second, current smokers are asked how many
cigarettes per day they smoke. Respondents report their daily consumption in nine categories,
ranging from “less than 5 cigarettes” up to “40 or more cigarettes”. We take the median value
5For the United Kingdom, the entities England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are considered as
separate geographical units in the analysis of smoking bans, since in these places the bans were introduced on
different dates.
6The assigned scores from the TCS are indicated in the columns next to the implementation dates in Table A.1.
The TCS reflects the results of expert surveys regarding tobacco control activities in the European countries. We
use the sum of the sub-scale scores for smoke-free policies in workplaces (max. ten points) and for the bans in
the hospitality sector (max. eight points) and divide it by the maximum achievable scores in order to build an
index [0,1] that reflects the comprehensiveness of the bans. In turn, our variable smoking banjt takes the value of
the index for country/region j at time t when a ban is in place.
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of each category to approximate the actual number of cigarettes smoked and impute the number
of 43 cigarettes for the top category.
In our analysis, we consider 21 European countries; i.e., Austria, Belgium, Cyprus (Republic of),
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
We use data from 9 survey waves covering the years 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995, 2002, 2005, 2006,
2009 and 2012. For Austria, Finland and Sweden, data are only available from the beginning of
1995. The newest members to the EU (i.e., Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia
and Slovakia) are part of our analysis from the year 2005 onwards.7
Figure 1 shows the development of the smoking prevalence, i.e., the share of smokers among the
adult respondents, and the average daily cigarette consumption of daily smokers per country.
The trends are separately shown for women and men. One can see that, on average, a larger
fraction of men smokes compared to women and that male smokers smoke more cigarettes than
female smokers. The smoking prevalence declines over the last two decades in most of the
European countries. For smokers, no clear trend is observable for the number of cigarettes
smoked. The average smoking prevalence in the sample is 0.31, with a standard deviation of
0.46. The average number of cigarettes consumed by smokers per day amounts to 15.95, with a
standard deviation of 9.11.
When considering the phenomenon of tobacco smoking in Europe overall, we observe a downward
trend in the prevalence of smoking over twenty years and, simultaneously, increasing taxes and
prices for cigarettes and the introduction of smoking bans. Table 1 reports the corresponding
correlations between the presence of a ban, cigarette prices and smoking behavior in our sample
when calculated using simple linear regressions.
7We exclude those countries for which we do not have information on the comprehensiveness of the smoking
bans from the TCS, i.e., those who implemented a smoking ban after January, 2011. This applies to Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. We further exclude Greece, where the ban was disobeyed due to the
lack of enforcement (no change in the sub-scales of the TCS), and Romania for which we only have observations
for two survey waves.
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Figure 1: Smoking prevalence and average daily cigarette consumption among smokers,
1990-2012
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Table 1: Correlation of smoking bans and cigarette prices with smoking behavior, 1990-2012
Smoking yes(=1) no(=0) Number of cigarettes (smokers)
I II III IV V VI
Smoking ban –0.087*** –0.083*** –0.660*** –0.742***
(–20.40) (–18.09) (–4.07) (–4.36)
ln(cigarette price) –0.032*** –0.008** –0.005 0.178
(–9.30) (–2.20) (–0.04) (1.41)
No. of observations 138,334 138,334 138,334 38,861 38,861 38,861
Notes: OLS estimations. t-values in parentheses. Coefficients for the constant are not shown.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** < .01.
Data source: Eurobarometer survey series.
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Specifications I to III show the correlation with the prevalence of smoking and specifications IV
to VI with the number of cigarettes consumed by smokers. On average, 8.65 percentage points
fewer people smoke in the years after an extensive smoking ban was introduced (specification I).
With regard to the price of cigarettes, we observe a negative correlation in specification II that
reflects a decrease in the prevalence of smoking of 1.30 percentage points for a 50 percent price
increase. This effect is much smaller than the decline in smoking prevalence of approximately 9
percentage points in the raw data. The heterogeneity across countries seems to prevent picking
up the full negative trend in prevalence by the positive trend in prices. This also holds for
specification III when simultaneously including bans and prices. A negative relationship also
shows up when we look at the correlation between smoking bans and the number of cigarettes
smoked by smokers (specifications IV and VI). No significant relationship between cigarette
prices and smokers’ cigarette consumption is observed in the pooled simple regression neither
in specification V, nor in specification VI when controlling for the ban. In a next step, we look
at the relationships in a multiple regression framework controlling for other sources of variation
that might drive the correlations between tobacco control policies and smoking behavior.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Methodology
The individual-level data allows us to examine the impact of smoking bans and cigarette prices
separately on the prevalence of smoking and the daily consumption of cigarettes. We apply a two-
part model of cigarette demand (Cragg 1971), a widely used approach in which the probability
of smoking is estimated in a first step (participation equation or extensive margin). In a separate
second step, the number of cigarettes smoked per day is estimated only for those who smoke
at least one cigarette per day (conditional demand equation or intensive margin).8 Moreover,
8The structure of such a two-part model is similar to Heckman’s two-stage sample selection model. However,
we aim at modeling actual smoking, as opposed to potential smoking (if a person does not smoke, he or she is
unlikely to display a latent positive expected consumption). For this case, the two-part model is more appropriate
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we propose an instrumental variable strategy to overcome the potential simultaneity problem
between cigarette demand and cigarette prices.
In the first step, the outcome is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if an individual reports being
a smoker, and 0 if not. In order to quantify the association between the variables capturing the
tobacco control policies and the propensity to smoke, we estimate a probit specification of the
following form:
P (smoke = 1)ijt = Φ (β0 + β1banjt + β2ln(price)jt + β3Xijt
+ β4Zjt + β5Sj + β6Dt + β7(Sj ∗ trend)).
(1)
The probit model accounts for the limited nature of the dependent variable. Φ is the cumu-
lative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The probability of smoking
P(smoke=1)ijt of individual i in country/region j at time t is regressed on an index variable
banjt [0,1] that captures the implementation of any smoking ban in the specific country/region
at the time of the survey. This approach exploits the staggered introduction of smoking bans
across European countries and regions to identify the effects on consumption behavior. The
second policy variable is ln(price)jt for the country-specific level of cigarette prices. In the
baseline specifications, the effect for cigarette prices is identified based on their variation within
countries over time (but see the instrumental variable strategy introduced below). As control
variables, we include individual socio-demographic characteristics Xi; i.e., age, sex, level of ed-
ucation, marital status, number of children in the same household, and the occupation of the
respondent. Further controls are a vector of country-level variables Zjt that consists of the real
GDP per capita in logarithmic form and the rates of unemployment and inflation. We include
a vector Sj of country-specific effects that will account for time-invariant regional heterogeneity
potentially correlated with smoking policies, such as, for instance, unobserved country-level sen-
timents towards smoking. In addition, we include a vector Dt to control for survey year-specific
(see, e.g., Dow and Norton 2003 or Madden 2008 for a discussion).
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time effects and country-specific linear time trends Sj*trend.
9 The time dummies and the inter-
actions of each country dummy variable with a time trend pick up generally decreasing trends
in smoking that are likely to be correlated with the the adoption of policies. This might, for
example, be due to a general trend in less favorable attitudes towards cigarette consumption,
thereby affecting smoking prevalence, as well as an increase in electoral support for tougher
policy interventions. For the calculation of standard errors, we apply a conservative estimation
strategy by clustering the standard errors at the country/region level. We apply sample weights
provided in the EB data files throughout to reproduce representative samples for each country.
Table A.2 in the Appendix offers descriptive statistics for the included variables, and Table A.3
lists the used surveys and data sources. The final sample consists of 138,334 observations.10
In the second part of our model, an OLS specification is applied to estimate the following
conditional demand equation:
E[Cijt|Cijt > 0] = β0 + β1banjt + β2ln(price)jt + β3Xijt
+ β4Zjt + β5Sj + β6Dt + β7(Sj ∗ trend)) + εijt,
(2)
where the dependent variable Cijt denotes the number of cigarettes consumed. The other vari-
ables are defined as in equation 1. The sample to estimate this equation consists of those 38,681
respondents who indicate that they smoke one or more cigarettes a day. As the distribution of
the number of cigarettes consumed tends to be skewed to the right, some studies recommend a
logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable. We apply a Box-Cox test (Box and Cox
1964), an iterative transformation procedure that compares maximum likelihood estimations of
log versus linear specifications. It allows testing which functional form of the dependent variable
provides the best fit for a given set of data. The results indicate that this is the case for the
9For the newest EU countries for which we only have few years of observation (i.e., three waves for Latvia
and Lithuania, and four waves for Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia), we include one common time
trend.
10We include all the observations except for people who refused to indicate their marital status or who no longer
knew how old they were when they finished their education. Individuals who do not report the number of children
in their household are identified by a separate indicator.
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untransformed linear specification.11
Another challenge for the identification of the behavioral response to price changes is simul-
taneity, i.e., that cigarette prices are an endogenous function of supply and demand, potentially
biasing our estimates of the price elasticity. In addition, from a public health point of view,
prices can primarily be steered through taxes. Consequently, in our preferred specifications, we
use the excise tax measures to instrument cigarette prices. This provides identification solely
from tax-induced price movements.
4.2 Effects of Smoking Bans and Cigarette Prices on Smoking Prevalence
Using reported smoking status as the binary dependent variable, we assess the consequences
of smoking bans and cigarette prices for the prevalence of smoking (see equation 1). Table 2
presents the corresponding average marginal effects from probit estimates. Price elasticities
are reported in square brackets with z-values in parentheses. The full regression outputs are
reported in Table A.4.12
The negative correlation between implemented smoking bans and people reporting their status as
smokers presented in the descriptive analysis in Section 3 remains economically and statistically
significant when additionally controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and country-level
variables, as well as country-specific fixed effects in specification I. However, the negative partial
correlation of the smoking ban is not robust to the inclusion of time effects and becomes statis-
tically non-significant and small when additionally taking time fixed effects and country-specific
time trends into account in the regressions (specifications II and III).
11In two robustness analyses, we estimate the daily cigarette consumption using, first, a generalized linear
model (GLM) with a log-link and and a gamma family distribution. Manning and Mullahy (2001) suggest this
alternative estimation procedure in order to take into account the logarithmic transformation of the dependent
variable. Second, we apply a tobit model that considers the right-censoring of our dependent variable at the
threshold value of 43 cigarettes per day. The resulting elasticities from both robustness exercises are very similar
compared to the estimates derived from equation 2.
12The estimated correlations between socio-economic characteristics and smoking behavior are in line with
empirically established relationships: high levels of education, being married, and not being unemployed are
related to a lower probability of being a smoker. GDP per capita is not significantly correlated to smoking
prevalence, while the rate of unemployment tends to be positively and the rate of inflation negatively related with
the status of being a smoker.
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Table 2: Tobacco control policies and the prevalence of smoking in 24 European countries and regions, 1990-2012
Dependent variable: smoking yes(=1) no(=0)
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Probit Probit Probit Probit IV-probit IV-probit IV-probit IV-probit
Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Females Males <30years
Smoking ban –0.028** 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.010 0.014
(–1.97) (0.27) (0.76) (0.87) (0.43) (0.10) (0.55) (0.55)
ln(cigarette price) –0.001 0.019 0.003 –0.030 0.022 –0.091* –0.120*
[–0.005] [0.068] [0.012] [–0.108] [0.102] [–0.274]* [–0.363]*
(–0.05) (0.80) (0.26) (–1.15) (0.84) (–1.87) (–1.67)
ln(specific taxes) –0.004
[–0.015]
(–0.68)
Ad valorem tax –0.046
[ –0.059]
(–1.44)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country/region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-spec. time trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 138,334 138,334 138,334 138,334 138,334 75,030 63,304 31,152
Pseudo-R2 0.071 0.072 0.073 0.073
Notes: Marginal effects from probit and IV-probit estimations. T-values in parentheses. Price elasticities in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of 24 countries/regions.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** < .01.
Data source: Eurobarometer survey series.
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For the same control strategies, specifications I to III show the statistical relationship between
cigarette prices and smoking prevalence in 21 European countries. We do not find systematic
partial correlations, ceteris paribus, with estimated elasticities between -0.01 and 0.07. However,
specifications I to III do not take the potential endogeneity of prices into account. Our preferred
estimations therefore either include taxes instead of prices or apply an instrumental variable
strategy. Specification IV looks at the direct effect of the excise tax measures on smoking preva-
lence. For both measures, there is a negative partial correlation that is imprecisely measured,
however. The negative effect of the ad valorem tax amounts to a decrease in the propensity to
smoke of 4.6 percentage points with an increase in the tax from 0 to 100 percent. This implies
a tax elasticity of -0.07. The point estimate for the corresponding elasticity for the specific
cigarette taxes is much smaller with -0.02. In specifications V to VIII, we apply an instrumental
variable approach based on maximum likelihood estimation (IV-probit), whereby we take the
tax measures as instruments for cigarette prices.13 When exploiting the price variation that is
driven by tax changes, we find a negative partial correlation between cigarette prices and the
propensity to smoke with a price elasticity of around -0.11. However, the statistical relationship
is imprecisely measured.
Moreover, the overall price effect masks heterogeneity with regard to the socio-demographic
characteristics of people: For males and for people under the age of 30, we find larger and
statistically significant price elasticities of -0.27 and -0.36, respectively. For males, an increase
in cigarette prices by 50 percent thus implies a reduction in their smoking propensity of 13.7
percent or an average marginal effect of about -3.7 percentage points. For people under the age of
30, the average marginal decrease in the prevalence of smoking amounts to -4.9 percentage points
with the same price increase. For female smokers in contrast, a not very precisely estimated
13The positive partial correlation of the tax measures with the endogenous variable ln(cigarette price) in the
first-stage regression is highly statistically significant at the 0.1%-level with a partial R2 of 0.265 and an F-statistic
of 6.19 (p-value=0.007). The effects of ln(specific taxes) and ad valorem taxes on ln(cigarette price) are 0.253
(t-value=3.39) and 1.223 (t-value=3.52), respectively. For the specific tax, the coefficient represents an elasticity.
Evaluated at the average value of the cigarette price of 163.40 euros and the average value of the specific tax
of 43.90 euros per 1,000 cigarettes, this implies a nearly one-to-one relationship between taxes and prices (a 10
percent increase in the tax of 4.39 euros is estimated to result in a price increase of 4.13 euros). An increase
in the ad valorem tax of 10 percentage points is estimated to lead to a cigarette price increase of 13.0 percent
(e0.122-1=0.130).
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price elasticity of +0.10 is observed. This strong differential reaction to cigarette prices between
women and men is consistent with previous evidence for the United States (see, e.g., Cawley
and Ruhm 2012).
4.3 Effects of Smoking Bans and Cigarette Prices on Conditional Demand
In contrast to the previous subsection where we analyzed the impact of the tobacco control
policies on the decision whether to smoke or not (extensive margin), we now consider whether
there is a systematic statistical relationship between the policies and the decision regarding how
much to smoke, conditional on smoking (intensive margin). This subsection thus presents the
results based on specifications of equation 2. We apply OLS estimations with the number of
cigarettes as the dependent variable. The results are summarized in Table 3.14
Specifications I to III indicate that the estimation results are sensitive to the inclusion of time
fixed effects and country-specific time trends. Once we control in a flexible way for time trends in
specification III, the policies do not relate to smoking intensity in a statistically significant way.
However, the number of cigarettes consumed per day is estimated to be slightly smaller if smoking
bans are in place and cigarette prices are higher. A negative but statistically insignificant price
elasticity of -0.04 is estimated, and a reduction of 0.11 cigarettes consumed per day after the
implementation of a comprehensive smoking ban. A negative effect of a larger magnitude holds
when considering the ad valorem tax, instead of prices, in specification IV. The coefficient of
-2.76 expresses that the number of cigarettes consumed per day is smaller by that amount if
the ad valorem tax increases by 100 percentage points. This implies an average ad valorem tax
elasticity of -0.06. For specific taxes, the imprecisely estimated elasticity is close to zero.
Specifications V to VIII present the results when cigarette prices are instrumented by cigarette
taxes. For the full sample as well as the different subgroups, the estimates show negative price
elasticities. They are not statistically significantly different from zero, however. For the full
sample, a slightly more elastic conditional demand compared to the impact of taxes of -0.08 is
14The full regression outputs are reported in Table A.5 in the Appendix.
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Table 3: Tobacco control policies and the smoking behavior of smokers (conditional demand) in 24 European countries and
regions, 1990-2012
Dependent variable: number of cigarettes per day
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Females Males <30years
Smoking ban 0.819*** 0.021 –0.114 0.053 –0.170 –0.490 –0.033 0.137
(2.99) (0.05) (–0.20) (0.09) (–0.33) (–0.90) (–0.05) (0.17)
ln(cigarette price) –2.298*** –2.006*** –0.592 –1.286 –1.241 –1.139 –2.931
[–0.149]*** [–0.131]*** [–0.039] [–0.084] [–0.091] [–0.068] [–0.220]
(–4.84) (–4.54) (–0.86) (–1.21) (–1.04) (–0.87) (–1.49)
ln(specific taxes) 0.021
[0.001]
(0.06)
Ad valorem tax –2.844**
[–0.064]**
(–2.23)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country/region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-spec. time trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 38,861 38,861 38,861 38,861 38,861 18,092 20,769 11,000
R2 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Notes: OLS and 2SLS estimations. T-values in parentheses. Price elasticities in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 24
countries/regions.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** < .01.
Data source: Eurobarometer survey series.
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estimated. With a 50 percent price increase, this implies a small reduction in the number of
cigarettes smoked of -0.52. This average price effect is of similar magnitude for male and female
smokers. The biggest negative effect is estimated for young smokers under the age of 30. The
point estimates suggest that they smoke, on average, 1.19 cigarettes less a day when cigarettes
are 50 percent more expensive. The corresponding price elasticity is -0.22.
5 Conclusion
There is a trend towards stricter policies to control tobacco consumption in many Western
countries. In Europe, this trend is accompanied by fewer people smoking today compared to
two decades ago. It is, however, difficult to assess whether tobacco control policies contributed
to this latter trend.
In our empirical analysis, we identify the behavioral consequences of two major restrictions to
smoking in Europe. For primarily fiscal reasons, cigarettes are rather heavily taxed in many
countries. The level and change in taxation are therefore major driving forces in the variation
in observed prices. Moreover, since 2004, starting in Ireland, more and more countries have
introduced spatial restrictions to smoking, primarily focusing on the workplace and the hospi-
tality sector but also reaching out to public transportation and to public places. Our empirical
strategy exploits the staggered introduction of smoking bans across 24 European countries and
regions and applies an instrumental variable strategy based on cigarette taxes to identify the
effect of price changes on the prevalence of smoking as well as the number of cigarettes consumed
by daily smokers. For both outcome variables, we analyze variation around country-specific time
trends.
We find, on average, no evidence that smoking bans systematically reduce smoking when taking
time trends into account.15 However, higher cigarette prices are weakly related to overall lower
reported levels of smoking, ceteris paribus. Our results reveal price elasticities for the propensity
15Please note that we are not assessing whether fewer people are exposed to passive smoke after the introduction
of smoking bans (for corresponding evidence see, e.g., Shetty et al. 2011).
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to smoke and conditional demand for cigarettes of around -0.11 and -0.08, respectively. Thereby,
the negative price effects are driven by the behavioral reactions of males (with a price elasticity
of -0.27) and of people under the age 30 (with a price elasticity of -0.36). When considering the
impact on daily cigarette consumption, conditional on being a daily smoker, people under the
age 30 show the strongest reaction to cigarette price increases amounting to a price elasticity of
-0.22. The literature discusses various reasons why the responsiveness to prices might be higher
for some socio-demographic groups. One argument is that young smokers have to spend a larger
fraction of their disposable income on a pack of cigarettes than adult smokers. Furthermore,
if the level of addiction increases with consumption over time, young smokers, who have been
smoking for a relatively shorter length of time, are better able to adjust their consumption to
changes in prices (see, e.g., Chaloupka and Warner 2000 or DeCicca et al. 2002 for a detailed
discussion). For the differential price sensitivity between women and men, the results of Cawley
et al. (2016) show that cigarette taxation will result in less behavior change among those for
whom the demand for cigarettes is derived from the demand for weight control, which applies
especially to young women.
Our results for Europe complement the findings for the United States, where smaller price
elasticities are estimated with individual-level data compared to studies based on data at the level
of states or provinces (e.g., Gallet and List 2003 or DeCicca and McLeod 2008). Furthermore,
our findings are in line with recent studies which apply refined estimation techniques and also
tend to find only small or even no effects of cigarette price or tax increases (e.g., Tauras 2006,
Adda and Cornaglia 2010, Callison and Kaestner 2014, or Hawkins et al. 2016).
When we apply the estimates of the marginal price effects to the average increase in cigarette
prices over the observation period, i.e., a price increase of about 60 percent, a decline in the
prevalence of smoking of roughly 1.41 percentage points is predicted. This is only about one
sixth of the total decline of about nine percentage points in the fraction of smokers over the
same time period. The introduction of smoking bans has no clear explanatory power in this
phenomenon. In other words, about five sixths of the decline in the prevalence of smoking
cannot be explained by our policy variables. This decline might, on the one hand, be due to
19
other policy interventions ranging from limitations and restrictions on advertising, packaging
and labeling to anti-smoking campaigns. On the other hand, much of the unexplained decline
might just reflect changes in health and lifestyle attitudes. There is thus ample scope for further
studies to investigate people’s tobacco consumption.
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Table A.1: Introduction dates of public smoking bans in 24 European countries and regions
Workplace ban Hospitality sector ban
Introduction Scope Introduction Scope
Country date [1-10] date [1-8]
Austria 01.01.09 2 01.07.10 2
Belgium 01.01.06 6 01.01.07 4
Cyprus (Republic of) 01.01.10 2 01.01.10 6
Denmark 15.08.07 4 15.08.07 4
Estonia 04.06.05 4 05.06.07 6
Finland 01.06.07 8 01.06.07 6
France 01.02.07 8 01.01.08 6
Germanya 01.08.07– 4 01.08.07– 4
01.07.08 01.07.08
Ireland 29.03.04 10 29.03.04 8
Italy 10.01.05 8 10.01.05 6
Latvia 01.07.06 4 01.07.06 4
01.10.10 8b
Lithuania 01.01.07 4 01.01.07 6
Luxembourg 05.09.06 4 05.09.06 4
Malta 01.04.05 8 01.04.05 6
Netherlands 01.01.04 6 01.07.08 4
Portugal 01.01.08 4 01.01.08 4
Slovakia 01.04.09 4 01.09.09 4
Slovenia 01.08.07 6 01.08.07 6
Spain 01.01.06 10 01.01.06 2
01.10.10 8b
Sweden 01.06.05 6 01.06.05 6
United Kingdom:
Wales 02.04.07 10 02.04.07 8
Scotland 01.03.06 10 01.03.06 8
England 01.07.07 10 01.07.07 8
Northern Ireland 30.04.07 10 30.04.07 8
Notes: a) In the federal states in Germany, smoking bans were implemented on different dates within the indicated
implementation period. However, we are not able to exploit the resulting variation in the introduction dates, as none of
the survey waves used in our analysis lies within this period. According to Joossens and Raw (2007, 2011), tobacco control
in workplaces in Germany became more restrictive between 2007 and 2010; i.e., the index of the Tobacco Control Scale
(TCS) increased from 2 to 4. As there is no change in the federal law, we assume that the change occurred parallel to the
implementation of bans in the hospitality sector. b) In Latvia, the ban in the hospitality sector was tightened on May 1st,
2010 and in Spain on January 1st, 2011.
Data source: European countries and regions in the United Kingdom: European Commission (2010), European Network
for Smoking Prevention (2010); German Laender: Aufmuth (2010), Kvasnicka (2010); TCS: Joossens and Raw (2006, 2007,
2011).
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for the full sample and the sample of smokers
Full sample Smokers
Mean SD Mean SD
Individual level
Smoking yes(=1) no(=0) 0.31 0.46 1.00 0.00
Number of cigarettes per day 4.57 8.71 15.95 9.11
Age 46.15 18.35 40.78 15.50
Female 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.50
Education up to age 15 or less 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.42
Education up to age 16-19 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.50
Education up to age 20 or more 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42
Education, still studying 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27
Married 0.55 0.50 0.49 0.50
Single with partner 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.36
Single 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.42
Divorced 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.29
Widowed 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.20
Other marital status 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10
No child in HH under age 15 0.57 0.50 0.51 0.50
One child in HH under age 15 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36
Two children in HH under age 15 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
Three children in HH under age 15 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17
Four or more children in HH under age 15 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26
No information about children in HH 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34
Unemployed 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.30
Without occupation 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.38
Retired 0.24 0.43 0.15 0.35
Manual worker 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.40
Farmer/fisherman 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09
Professional 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12
Self-employed 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20
Business propriator 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13
Employed professional 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.12
General management 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11
Middle management 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23
Employed position (desk) 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
Employed position (travel) 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.18
Service sector 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28
Supervisor 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11
Country level
Smoking ban 0.21 0.31 0.18 0.30
Real cigarette price per 1000 163.40 60.90 161.84 62.32
ln(cigarette price) 5.03 0.39 5.01 0.40
Real specific taxes 43.90 38.46 44.01 38.98
ln(specific taxes) 3.26 1.14 3.24 1.18
Ad valorem taxes 0.35 0.16 0.35 0.16
Real GDP per capita 23,737.42 7,006.17 23,790.14 6,750.01
ln(GDP per capita) 10.04 0.28 10.04 0.27
Unemployment rate 8.35 3.41 8.39 3.47
Inflation rate 2.70 1.85 2.74 1.83
No. of observations 138,334 38,861
Data Sources: Individual-level data is from Eurobarometer survey series. HH stands for household. For country level data
see Tables A.1 and A.3
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Figure A.1: Real cigarette prices and specific taxes per 1,000 cigarettes (in 2005 euros) and ad
valorem tax rates, 1990-2012
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Data source: Own calculations based on the Excise Duty Tables provided by the European
Commission (1990-2012b) and on country-specific price level information (see Table A.3 for
detailed data sources).
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Table A.3: Data sources
Individual-level data from Eurobarometer
Smoking behaviour
- Surveys: 34.1; 38.0; 41.0; 43.0; 58.2; 64.1; 66.2; 72.3; 77.1.
- Question and answers for smoking participation: Which of the following applies to your-
self? 1. You smoke manufactured cigarettes; 2. You smoke roll-your-own cigarettes; 3.
You smoke cigars or a pipe; 4. You used to smoke but you have stopped; 5. You have
never smoked.
- Question and answers for number of cigarettes: How many cigarettes a day do you smoke?
1. less than 5 cigarettes a day; 2. 5 to 9 cigarettes a day; 3. 10 to 14 cigarettes a day; 4.
15 to 19 cigarettes a day; 5. 20 to 24 cigarettes a day; 6. 25 to 29 cigarettes a day; 7. 30
to 34 cigarettes a day; 8. 35 to 39 cigarettes a day; 9. 40 or more cigarettes a day; 10. Do
not smoke every day
Country level data
Cigarette prices and taxes
- European Commission: ec.europa.eu (Excise Duty Tables 1990-2012)
Gross domestic product
- Eurostat: epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (data file nama aux gph)
- World Bank: data.worldbank.org (for Ireland and Portugal)
Unemployment rate
- Eurostat: epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (data file une rt a)
Inflation rate
- Eurostat: epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (data file prc hicp aind)
- OECD: stats.oecd.org (for 1990)
Price level index
- Eurostat: epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (data file prc ppp ind)
- OECD: stats.oecd.org (for 1990-1994)
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Table A.4: Full regression output of Table 2
Dependent variable: smoking yes(=1) no(=0)
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Probit Probit Probit Probit IV-probit IV-probit IV-probit IV-probit
Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Females Males <30years
Smoking ban –0.028** 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.010 0.014
(–1.97) (0.27) (0.76) (0.87) (0.43) (0.10) (0.55) (0.55)
ln(cigarette price) –0.001 0.019 0.003 –0.030 0.022 –0.091* –0.120*
(–0.05) (0.80) (0.26) (–1.15) (0.84) (–1.87) (–1.67)
ln(specific taxes) –0.004
(–0.68)
Ad valorem tax –0.046
(–1.44)
ln(GDP per capita) –0.043 –0.007 –0.030 –0.015 –0.013 0.033 –0.066 –0.050
(–1.20) (–0.31) (–0.57) (–0.29) (–0.27) (0.64) (–0.81) (–0.45)
Unemployment rate 0.000 0.000 –0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.009***
(0.45) (0.22) (–0.03) (0.52) (0.86) (0.84) (0.17) (3.07)
Inflation rate 0.001 –0.005*** –0.004*** –0.004*** –0.004*** –0.005** –0.003 –0.001
(0.86) (–4.08) (–2.69) (–2.80) (–2.83) (–2.47) (–1.00) (–0.24)
Age 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.106***
(6.93) (6.97) (6.95) (6.95) (6.95) (4.28) (9.65) (8.84)
Age2/100 –0.015*** –0.015*** –0.015*** –0.015*** –0.015*** –0.014*** –0.017*** –0.220***
(–12.89) (–12.84) (–12.82) (–12.82) (–12.81) (–9.13) (–13.92) (–8.63)
Female –0.098*** –0.098*** –0.098*** –0.098*** –0.098*** –0.044***
(–6.69) (–6.69) (–6.72) (–6.72) (–6.72) (–3.17)
Education until less than age 15 Reference
Education up to age 16-19 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.024 –0.014 –0.034
(0.43) (0.52) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (1.33) (–1.03) (–1.08)
Education up to age 20 or more –0.067*** –0.065*** –0.064*** –0.064*** –0.064*** –0.048** –0.084*** –0.150***
(–3.58) (–3.41) (–3.39) (–3.38) (–3.39) (–2.03) (–5.22) (–4.13)
Education, still studying –0.137*** –0.133*** –0.133*** –0.133*** –0.133*** –0.126*** –0.177*** –0.163***
(–4.63) (–4.48) (–4.49) (–4.48) (–4.49) (–4.69) (–4.70) (–3.32)
Married Reference
Single with partner 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.080***
(7.01) (7.11) (7.03) (7.06) (7.03) (7.04) (5.01) (5.64)
Single 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.072*** 0.036*** 0.055***
(7.99) (7.90) (8.01) (8.01) (7.97) (9.90) (5.38) (4.10)
Divorced 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.157*** 0.187***
(20.05) (20.00) (20.25) (20.22) (20.25) (20.88) (14.81) (7.08)
Widowed 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.059*** 0.101*** 0.043
(4.80) (4.78) (4.89) (4.89) (4.89) (6.99) (8.78) (0.59)
Other marital status 0.022** 0.025** 0.028** 0.029** 0.029*** 0.043*** 0.042** 0.031
(1.99) (2.22) (2.53) (2.56) (2.61) (3.03) (2.12) (1.08)
No children in HH under age 15 Reference
One child in HH under age 15 –0.008* –0.007 –0.007 –0.007 –0.007 –0.006 –0.014* 0.008
(–1.70) (–1.51) (–1.40) (–1.40) (–1.40) (–1.13) (–1.74) (0.80)
Two children in HH under age 15 –0.027*** –0.026*** –0.025*** –0.025*** –0.025*** –0.030*** –0.027*** 0.025*
(Continued on next page)
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(–3.23) (–3.16) (–3.09) (–3.09) (–3.09) (–3.30) (–2.78) (1.84)
Three children in HH under age 15 –0.028*** –0.027*** –0.026*** –0.026*** –0.026*** –0.028*** –0.033** 0.042**
(–3.03) (–2.80) (–2.68) (–2.68) (–2.68) (–2.80) (–2.45) (2.02)
Four or more children in HH under age 15 0.004 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.006 0.014 0.058**
(0.60) (1.02) (1.08) (1.08) (1.08) (0.46) (0.98) (2.40)
No information about children in HH 0.033*** –0.061 –0.070 –0.071 –0.071 –0.041 –0.088 –0.176**
(5.10) (–1.06) (–1.25) (–1.26) (–1.27) (–0.67) (–1.12) (–1.98)
Manual worker Reference
Unemployed 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.026*** 0.087*** 0.027
(7.47) (7.32) (7.28) (7.27) (7.27) (3.07) (8.27) (1.63)
Without occupation –0.060*** –0.060*** –0.061*** –0.061*** –0.061*** –0.034*** –0.054 –0.071***
(–4.21) (–4.25) (–4.35) (–4.36) (–4.35) (–4.46) (–1.63) (–3.03)
Retired –0.018 –0.018 –0.018 –0.018 –0.018 –0.009 –0.038*** 0.010
(–1.63) (–1.54) (–1.55) (–1.55) (–1.55) (–0.58) (–3.68) (0.29)
Farmer/fisherman –0.142*** –0.140*** –0.139*** –0.139*** –0.139*** –0.195*** –0.146*** –0.215***
(–8.73) (–8.80) (–8.90) (–8.88) (–8.89) (–7.03) (–8.32) (–4.82)
Professional –0.060*** –0.061*** –0.061*** –0.061*** –0.060*** –0.037 –0.074*** –0.135***
(–4.17) (–4.20) (–4.23) (–4.22) (–4.21) (–1.49) (–4.84) (–4.21)
Self-employed –0.020* –0.020* –0.021* –0.021* –0.021* –0.004 –0.036** –0.022
(–1.88) (–1.89) (–1.95) (–1.95) (–1.95) (–0.32) (–2.42) (–1.20)
Business propriator –0.042*** –0.041*** –0.041*** –0.041*** –0.041*** –0.004 –0.067*** –0.082**
(–3.74) (–3.59) (–3.56) (–3.55) (–3.53) (–0.21) (–4.57) (–2.57)
Employed professional –0.111*** –0.111*** –0.111*** –0.111*** –0.111*** –0.089*** –0.121*** –0.109***
(–8.14) (–8.26) (–8.13) (–8.13) (–8.14) (–7.38) (–6.92) (–4.64)
General management –0.089*** –0.091*** –0.092*** –0.092*** –0.092*** –0.053*** –0.114*** –0.007
(–6.24) (–6.36) (–6.48) (–6.48) (–6.47) (–3.16) (–6.46) (–0.16)
Middle management –0.098*** –0.098*** –0.098*** –0.098*** –0.098*** –0.080*** –0.111*** –0.117***
(–9.83) (–9.99) (–10.14) (–10.14) (–10.11) (–6.73) (–9.70) (–6.37)
Employed position (desk) –0.083*** –0.083*** –0.083*** –0.083*** –0.083*** –0.061*** –0.117*** –0.093***
(–9.18) (–9.22) (–9.24) (–9.23) (–9.23) (–5.46) (–8.53) (–8.17)
Employed position (travel) –0.021** –0.019** –0.019** –0.020** –0.020** –0.007 –0.031** –0.041**
(–2.37) (–2.25) (–2.29) (–2.30) (–2.31) (–0.55) (–2.13) (–2.26)
Service sector –0.036*** –0.036*** –0.035*** –0.035*** –0.035*** –0.027*** –0.052*** –0.049***
(–5.36) (–5.09) (–5.11) (–5.13) (–5.11) (–2.81) (–4.52) (–3.89)
Supervisor –0.039** –0.039** –0.039** –0.039** –0.039** –0.042 –0.049*** –0.046
(–2.49) (–2.49) (–2.48) (–2.49) (–2.49) (–1.47) (–2.66) (–1.49)
Country/region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-spec. time trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 138,334 138,334 138,334 138,334 138,334 75,030 63,304 31,152
Pseudo-R2 0.071 0.072 0.073 0.073
Notes: Marginal effects from probit and IV-probit estimations. Z-values in parentheses. Price elasticities in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the level of
24 countries/regions. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** < .01.
Data source: Eurobarometer survey series.
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Table A.5: Full regression output of Table 3
Dependent variable: number of cigarettes
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Full sample Females Males <30years
Smoking ban 0.819*** 0.021 –0.114 0.053 –0.170 –0.490 –0.033 0.137
(2.99) (0.05) (–0.20) (0.09) (–0.33) (–0.90) (–0.05) (0.17)
ln(cigarette price) –2.298*** –2.006*** –0.592 –1.286 –1.241 –1.139 –2.931
(–4.84) (–4.54) (–0.86) (–1.21) (–1.04) (–0.87) (–1.49)
ln(specific taxes) 0.021
(0.06)
Ad valorem tax –2.844**
(–2.23)
ln(GDP per capita) –0.805 1.881 1.714 1.915 2.097 1.906 2.434 1.396
(–0.68) (1.57) (0.75) (0.86) (0.88) (0.69) (0.75) (0.26)
Unemployment rate 0.021 –0.035 –0.052 –0.048 –0.031 0.024 –0.086 0.008
(0.46) (–1.19) (–1.11) (–1.13) (–0.57) (0.35) (–1.31) (0.06)
Inflation rate –0.077 –0.110 –0.102 –0.086 –0.110* –0.210** –0.030 –0.231**
(–1.50) (–1.44) (–1.66) (–1.43) (–1.67) (–1.97) (–0.35) (–2.28)
Age 0.515*** 0.519*** 0.520*** 0.520*** 0.520*** 0.425*** 0.583*** 0.982***
(18.20) (18.33) (17.82) (17.84) (18.21) (8.97) (20.88) (5.62)
Age2/100 –0.554*** –0.557*** –0.558*** –0.558*** –0.558*** –0.488*** –0.616*** –1.642***
(–18.43) (–18.44) (–18.03) (–18.06) (–18.43) (–10.00) (–19.21) (–4.06)
Education until less than age 15 Reference
Education up to age 16-19 –0.751*** –0.751*** –0.727*** –0.726*** –0.729*** –0.913*** –0.476** –1.471***
(–4.26) (–4.32) (–4.20) (–4.18) (–4.30) (–3.81) (–2.30) (–5.39)
Education up to age 20 or more –1.990*** –1.983*** –1.969*** –1.966*** –1.969*** –2.181*** –1.672*** –3.440***
(–8.51) (–8.30) (–8.45) (–8.43) (–8.63) (–6.47) (–7.34) (–10.85)
Education, still studying –1.807*** –1.799*** –1.797*** –1.800*** –1.796*** –3.210*** –2.666*** –3.228***
(–4.14) (–4.20) (–4.20) (–4.22) (–4.30) (–8.63) (–3.25) (–6.58)
Married Reference
Single with partner 0.258 0.391* 0.398* 0.399* 0.397** 0.460* 0.409 0.342
(1.29) (1.99) (2.00) (2.01) (2.04) (1.94) (1.48) (1.34)
Single 0.248 0.346** 0.368** 0.366** 0.366** 0.632*** 0.298 0.274
(1.52) (2.22) (2.31) (2.31) (2.34) (4.80) (1.54) (1.46)
Divorced 1.197*** 1.344*** 1.342*** 1.348*** 1.340*** 2.020*** 1.791*** 1.826***
(4.48) (4.97) (5.03) (5.07) (5.12) (8.06) (5.44) (3.18)
Widowed 0.269 0.401 0.414 0.421 0.412 1.377*** 1.485*** 0.905
(0.87) (1.25) (1.28) (1.30) (1.31) (4.77) (2.64) (0.38)
Other marital status –0.061 0.022 0.036 0.047 0.067 –0.147 0.647 0.474
(–0.12) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.15) (–0.21) (1.08) (1.13)
No children in HH under age 15 Reference
One child in HH under age 15 –0.511*** –0.463** –0.454** –0.451** –0.454*** –0.497*** –0.086 –0.309
(–2.88) (–2.71) (–2.64) (–2.63) (–2.70) (–2.72) (–0.41) (–1.17)
Two children in HH under age 15 –0.788*** –0.727*** –0.711*** –0.712*** –0.710*** –0.765*** –0.438* –0.194
(–4.12) (–3.86) (–3.67) (–3.68) (–3.77) (–4.04) (–1.78) (–0.72)
Three children in HH under age 15 0.153 0.228 0.213 0.214 0.212 –0.145 0.667 1.496***
(Continued on next page)
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(0.44) (0.65) (0.61) (0.61) (0.62) (–0.47) (1.29) (2.74)
Four or more children in HH under age 15 0.081 0.374* 0.408* 0.408* 0.409** 0.573 0.526 0.564
(0.42) (1.86) (1.95) (1.96) (2.01) (1.37) (1.45) (1.44)
No info about children in HH 0.375 –1.163 –1.257 –1.268 –1.269 –3.335* 1.751 –4.650*
(1.16) (–0.50) (–0.54) (–0.54) (–0.55) (–1.94) (0.78) (–1.93)
Manual worker Reference
Unemployed –0.096 –0.107 –0.095 –0.098 –0.096 0.791** 0.100 –0.367
(–0.57) (–0.62) (–0.55) (–0.57) (–0.57) (2.39) (0.43) (–1.36)
Without occupation –2.158*** –2.137*** –2.158*** –2.155*** –2.158*** 0.418* –1.018 –1.597***
(–6.15) (–6.17) (–6.29) (–6.28) (–6.43) (1.89) (–1.27) (–4.10)
Retired –0.384 –0.386 –0.384 –0.381 –0.385 0.781*** –0.319 –0.625
(–1.22) (–1.23) (–1.23) (–1.21) (–1.25) (3.02) (–0.83) (–0.48)
Farmer/fisherman –0.179 –0.165 –0.119 –0.113 –0.122 –3.198 –0.347 0.074
(–0.24) (–0.22) (–0.16) (–0.15) (–0.16) (–1.54) (–0.59) (0.07)
Professional –0.630 –0.649 –0.677 –0.677 –0.673 0.646 –0.952 –1.398
(–0.96) (–0.95) (–1.02) (–1.03) (–1.04) (0.85) (–1.20) (–1.09)
Self-employed 0.754*** 0.757*** 0.708** 0.708** 0.708*** 1.442*** 0.630** 1.304**
(2.99) (3.01) (2.79) (2.79) (2.86) (3.10) (2.48) (2.50)
Business propriator 0.826** 0.823** 0.802** 0.802** 0.806** 0.253 0.945** 0.364
(2.31) (2.30) (2.29) (2.29) (2.34) (0.38) (2.19) (0.30)
Emloyed professional –2.395*** –2.402*** –2.391*** –2.393*** –2.393*** –1.147 –2.307*** –1.588**
(–4.95) (–4.97) (–5.02) (–5.03) (–5.13) (–1.58) (–4.59) (–2.57)
General management –0.225 –0.228 –0.256 –0.259 –0.252 –0.030 –0.437 0.115
(–0.51) (–0.52) (–0.57) (–0.58) (–0.57) (–0.05) (–0.71) (0.08)
Middle management –1.225*** –1.224*** –1.225*** –1.223*** –1.225*** –0.476 –1.046*** –1.240*
(–4.86) (–4.82) (–4.90) (–4.88) (–5.01) (–1.12) (–5.67) (–1.88)
Employed position (desk) –2.539*** –2.524*** –2.532*** –2.530*** –2.535*** –1.176*** –1.635*** –2.215***
(–9.18) (–9.12) (–9.33) (–9.29) (–9.48) (–3.85) (–4.20) (–7.37)
Employed position (travel) 0.225 0.208 0.212 0.209 0.210 –0.266 0.274 –0.272
(0.85) (0.78) (0.80) (0.78) (0.81) (–0.62) (1.22) (–0.62)
Service sector –1.620*** –1.601*** –1.624*** –1.621*** –1.623*** –0.442* –0.649** –1.362***
(–7.59) (–7.61) (–7.80) (–7.76) (–7.98) (–1.70) (–2.29) (–4.92)
Supervisor 0.112 0.106 0.114 0.115 0.111 –0.448 –0.380 –0.235
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (–0.74) (–0.71) (–0.19)
No. of observations 38,861 38,861 38,861 38,861 38,861 18,092 20,769 11,000
R2 0.112 0.114 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.097 0.101 0.118
Country/region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-spec. time trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS and 2SLS estimations. T-values in parentheses. Price elasticities in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 24 countries/regions.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** < .01.
Data source: Eurobarometer survey series.
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